

REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

Claims 1-20 are pending in the present application. Claims 3-5, 7, 10-12, 14, 15 and 17-19 have been amended herewith. Reconsideration of the claims is respectfully requested.

I. 35 U.S.C. § 101

Claims 15-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed towards non-statutory subject matter. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Claim 15 recites that the computer program product is encoded in a computer readable medium and operable in a data processing system for providing host information, as specifically allowed for per the requirements of MPEP 706.03(a) and 2106. See, in particular, MPEP 2106(IV)(B)(1)(a) where it states:

“A claimed **computer-readable medium** encoded with a data structure defines structural and functional interrelationships between the data structure and the computer software and hardware components which permit the data structure's functionality to be realized, and is thus statutory. See *Lowry*, 32 F.3d at 1583-84, 32 USPQ2d at 1035.” (emphasis added by Applicants)

Accordingly, as Claim 15 expressly recites a computer program product encoded in a computer readable medium and operable in a data processing system for providing host information, it is shown that Claim 15 (and similarly for Claims 16-20) is directed to statutory subject matter, *pursuant to the USPTO's own MPEP rules*.

Still further, Claim 15 explicitly recites a computer program product encoded in a computer readable medium and operable in a data processing system for providing host information, which is either a 'manufacture' or a 'composition of matter', both of which are statutorily recognized subject matter¹. In addition, since Claim 15 explicitly recites a computer program product encoded in a computer readable medium and operable in a data processing system, such claim does *not* fall within one of the three

¹ 35 U.S.C. 101 Inventions patentable.

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

judicially determined exceptions of: natural phenomenon, law of nature or abstract idea (see, e.g., MPEP 2106 and in particular MPEP 2106(IV)(B) and (C)), but instead is limited to a practical application in the technological arts². Thus, it is further shown that Claim 15 has been erroneously rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as the invention recited therein does not fall within a judicial exception but instead is limited to a practical application in the technological arts.

The Examiner notes concern that the claimed computer-readable medium may encompass 'any sort of signal', which the Examiner asserts to not fall into one of the four statutory classes of invention. Appellants respectfully submit that both *In re Lowry*, *Id.* and the MPEP explicitly state that computer-readable medium encoded with a data structure is statutory – without any type of 'signal' exception as now alleged by the Examiner to be the current state of the law. Because it is permissible to claim information embodied in a storage medium (*In re Beauregard*, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995)), it is worth noting that the "difference between information storage and information communication is fundamentally only a difference in one's inertial frame of reference." Michael P. Frank, "The Physical Limits of Computing," *Computing in Science & Engineering*, May/June 2002, at 24. The following six cases conclusively establish judicial precedent that electrical signals – such as transmission-type media - are physical, and statutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

In *AT & T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc.*, 172 F.3d 1352, 50 USPQ2d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the CAFC stated at one point about electrical signals being physical:

The Arrhythmia court reasoned that the method claims qualified as statutory subject matter by noting that the steps **transformed physical, electrical signals from one form into another.**

Turning to *Arrhythmia Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.*, 958 F.2d 1053, 22 USPQ2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the CAFC wrote about electrical signals being physical:

These claimed steps of "converting", "applying", "determining", and "comparing" are physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into another. **The view that "there is nothing necessarily physical about 'signals' is incorrect**, citing *In re Taner*, 681 F.2d 787 (CAFC 1982) (emphasis added by Appellants).

² Only when the claim is devoid of any limitation to a practical application in the technological arts should it be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Compare *Musgrave*, 431 F.2d at 893, 167 USPQ at 289; *In re Foster*, 438 F.2d 1011, 1013, 169 USPQ 99, 101 (CCPA 1971).

Turning to *In re Taner*, Id., where the PTO was fighting an appeal of a rejection of the PTO Board of Appeals of a claim for a signal, the CCPA (the predecessor court to the CAFC) wrote:

Though the [PTO] board conceded that appellants' process includes "conversion of seismic signals into a different form, it took the position that "there is nothing necessarily physical about 'signals'" and that "the end product of [appellants' invention] is a mathematical result in the form of a pure number." That characterization is contrary to the views expressed by this court in *In re Sherwood*, 613 F.2d 809 (CCPA 1980) and *In re Johnson*, 589 F.2d 1020 (CCPA 1978), where signals were viewed as physical and the processes were viewed as transforming them to a different state. ... and in Sherwood expressly recognized that "seismic traces are ... physical apparitions." 613 F.2d at 819. That those "physical apparitions" may be expressed in mathematical terms is in our view irrelevant (emphasis added by Appellants).

The last case is the Supreme Court decision *O'Reilly v. Morse* from 1853 (56 U.S. 62), in which the Supreme Court upheld the following product claim for signals:

1. I claim as my invention the system of signs consisting of dots spaces and of dots, spaces and horizontal lines for numerals, letters, words or sentences substantially as herein set forth and illustrated for telegraph purposes.

So, across decades of judicial decisions, we have the CAFC and the Federal Circuit repeatedly stating that electrical signals are physical, backed up by the Supreme Court. Being physical, such signals are tangible articles. Since such signals can be manufactured according to numerous varieties of technological methods, such signals are articles of manufacture or composition of matter, both of which are statutory categories of patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, Claim 15 is shown to be statutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as it explicitly recites a computer program product encoded in a computer readable medium and operable in a data processing system for providing host information, pursuant to both (extensive) judicial case law and the USPTO's own MPEP rules. Accordingly, Claim 15 (and dependent Claims 16-20) has been erroneously rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Therefore the rejection of Claims 15-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 has been overcome.

II. 35 U.S.C. § 112, Second Paragraph

Claims 3-5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which Applicants regard as the invention. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

With respect to Claim 3, the Examiner notes duplicative terminology in such claim. Applicants have amended Claim 3 (and Claims 5, 10, 12, 17 and 19) to delete this duplicative terminology.

With respect to Claim 4 (and dependent Claim 5), the Examiner notes a lack of clarity in the 'from when' terminology. Applicants have amended Claim 4 (and Claims 11 and 18) to clarify this terminology.

Therefore the rejection of Claims 3-5 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph has been overcome.

III. 35 U.S.C. § 102, Anticipation

Claims 1, 8 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Nelson (US Patent No. 6,292,838 B1), hereinafter "Nelson". This rejection is respectfully traversed.

For a prior art reference to anticipate in terms of 35 U.S.C. 102, *every element* of the claimed invention must be *identically shown* in a single reference. *In re Bond*, 910 F.2d 831, 15 USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis added by Applicants). Applicants will now show that every element recited in Claims 1, 8 and 15 is not identically shown in the cited Nelson reference, and therefore Claims 1, 8 and 15 have been erroneously rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Nelson.

With respect to Claim 1, such claim recites steps of "receiving a request for host information for a remote computer from a requestor wherein the request includes one of a host name or an Internet Protocol address and is received from the requestor", "identifying a media access control address and a subnet mask using the request" and "returning a response to the requestor, wherein the response includes the media access control address and the subnet mask". As can be seen, a request for host information is received from a requestor, and a response is returned to this requestor. In addition, both the 'identifying' step and the 'returning' step have two distinct items associated therewith – (1) a media access control address and (2) a subnet mask.

In rejecting the claimed 'receiving' step, the Examiner states that this step is taught by Nelson at Col. 10, lines 1-7. Applicants urge that there, Nelson states (the entire initial sentence is included for proper context):

“ARP defines the protocol rules for establishing and maintaining these correlations, and providing address conversions from IP addresses to MAC addresses. The Reverse ARP protocol performs translations from MAC addresses to IP addresses.

The present system takes advantage of the fact that ARP software maintains IP address to MAC address mappings in its address cache during normal packet forwarding operations of a router.”

As can be seen, this cited passage makes no mention of any type of *request for host information*, or the receiving of such a (missing) request for host information. Rather, it describes an ability to (i) map/translate between IP addresses and MAC addresses and (ii) to forward packets using such address mapping/translation. The significance of this missing claimed feature #1 will become more apparent in the discussion below regarding missing claimed features #2 and #3.

In rejecting the claimed ‘identifying’ step, the Examiner states that this step is taught by Nelson at Col. 10, lines 7-9. Applicants urge that there, Nelson states:

“Specifically, when an incoming packet, destined for a network device on a specific subnet, arrives at a router, the router searches the ARP cache to find a MAC address that matches the IP address.”

As can be seen, this cited passage describes a router searching a cache to find a MAC address that matches the IP address for a network device for which an incoming packet is destined for. There is no teaching of identifying a subnet mask using a (received) request for host information. Instead, a packet *destined for a network device is processed*. Since such packet is not a *request for host information*, any address mapping of this packet (IP address to MAC address mapping) as described by Nelson does not in fact teach identifying a subnet mask using a request for host information. Claim 1 explicitly recites “*identifying a media access control address and a subnet mask using the request*” (the request being defined in the first step of Claim 1 to be a request for host information that is received from a requestor). This identifying of a subnet mask using the request for host information is missing claimed feature #2.

In rejecting the claimed ‘returning’ step, the Examiner states that this step is taught by Nelson at Col. 10, lines 7-19 and Col. 1, lines 45-46). Applicants urge that there, Nelson states:

“Specifically, when an incoming packet, destined for a network device on a specific subnet, arrives at a router, the router searches the ARP cache to find a MAC address that

matches the IP address. If the router finds a corresponding MAC address, then the packet can be converted to include the new MAC address. If no corresponding MAC address is found for that IP address, ARP software broadcasts a request packet in a special format to all network devices on the attached subnet to see if a network device has the IP address associated with one of its interfaces. *A network device that recognizes the IP address as being associated with one of its network interfaces returns a reply so indicating.* ARP then updates the ARP cache for future reference.”

As can be seen, this cited passage only describes the returning of a reply that indicates its IP address. This is different from what is recited in the claimed ‘returning’ step for numerous reasons (which are conglomerated here together as missing claimed feature #3). First, per these teachings the reply is returned to the *router*, which is not equivalent to the claimed *requestor* (as the claimed *requestor* is the item/thing that *a request for host information was received from*, and per the rejection of the ‘identifying’ step the router is being equated by the Examiner to be the claimed data processing system that performs all three steps of ‘receiving’, ‘identifying’ and ‘returning’). To interpret this otherwise (improperly equating the Nelson router with the claimed requestor) would in effect mean that the router is returning information to itself (if it is deemed by the Examiner that the router is equivalent to both the claimed data processing system and the claimed requestor), which shows this is not a reasonable interpretation of the teachings as it leads to an illogical result. Second, ‘what’ gets returned per this cited passage is an *IP address* of a network device. In contrast, Claim 1 recites that a *media access control address* (which is different from an IP address) is returned. Third, this cited passage only describes the return of one item (an IP address), whereas Claim 1 recites the returning of two distinct items – per the features of Claim 1 the data processing system returns *both* (1) a media access control address *and* (2) a subnet mask (and this two-item distinction is further articulated below with respect to the Claim 4 comments).

Therefore, because of missing claimed features #1, #2 and #3 identified above, it is shown that every element recited in Claim 1 is not identically shown in a single reference, and therefore Claim 1 has been erroneously rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as being anticipated by Nelson.

Applicants traverse the rejection of Claims 8 and 15 for similar reasons to those given above with respect to Claim 1.

Therefore, the rejection of Claims 1, 8 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) has been overcome.

IV. 35 U.S.C. § 103, Obviousness

Claims 2, 9 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nelson as applied to Claims 1, 8 and 15 above, in view of Bullman et al. (US Publication No.: 2002/0162038 A1), hereinafter “Bullman”. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Applicants initially traverse the rejection of Claim 2 (and similarly for Claims 9 and 16) for reasons given above with respect to Claim 1 (of which Claim 2 depends upon), and urge that the additional cited Bullman reference does not overcome the numerous teaching deficiencies identified above with respect to Claim 1.

Further with respect to Claim 2 (and similarly for Claims 9 and 16), it is urged that none of the cited references teach or suggest the claimed feature of “wherein the requestor generates a wake-up packet using the host information and sends the wake-up packet to the remote computer”, with the requestor being the same requestor for which a request for host information was received from, and where such request (that is received from the requester) includes one of a host name or an Internet Protocol address (per Claim 1). In contrast, per the teachings of Bullman (which is being cited as teaching all features of Claim 2), the PHY device sends a wake-up packet. However, this PHY device is not equivalent to the claimed requestor, since requests that include one of a host name or an Internet Protocol address are not received from this PHY device. Per the features of Claim 2 in combination with Claim 1, *the requestor that generates that wake-up packet using host information is the same requestor that requested the host information*. The combined teachings of the cited reference do not establish a teaching/suggestion of a same device that requested host information also generates a wake-up packet using this same (requested) host information. Therefore, it is further urged that Claim 2 (and similarly for Claims 9 and 16) is not obvious in view of the cited references.

Therefore, the rejection of Claims 2, 9 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 has been overcome.

V. 35 U.S.C. § 103, Obviousness

Claims 3, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 20 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nelson as applied to Claims 1, 8 and 15 above, in view of Harrison et al. (US Publication No.: 2004/0177133 A1) hereinafter “Harrison”. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Applicants initially traverse the rejection of Claim 3 (and similarly for Claims 10 and 17) for reasons given above with respect to Claim 1 (of which Claim 3 depends upon), and urge that the additional cited Harrison reference does not overcome the numerous teaching deficiencies identified above with respect to Claim 1.

Further with respect to Claim 3 (and similarly for Claims 10 and 17), it is urged that none of the cited references teach or suggest the claimed feature of “wherein the media access control address and the

subnet mask are received from a dynamic host configuration protocol server and are stored in the data processing system". In rejecting Claim 3, the Examiner states that Harrison teaches all of the features of Claim 3 at paragraph [0073], lines 1-11. Applicants urge that there, Harrison states:

"[0073] During the processing of the request from a DHCP client for an IP address (and additional configuration information), the DHCP server may examine the message and apply simple rules to the values of various message fields, such as chaddr (client hardware address), giaddr (relay agent IP address), and numbered options (optional parameter fields.) (For details on the DHCP message, see RFC 2131, by R. Droms). These rules may determine the specific content of the DHCP response, which supplies the client with host configuration parameters, including IP address for the client, IP address of a DNS server, IP address of a TFTP server, name of a device configuration bootfile (in the case of a cable modem), and other parameters" (emphasis added by Applicants).

As can be seen, while this passage briefly alludes to a client hardware address that is 'examined' and rules are applied to it by a DHCP server, this cited passage does not teach (or otherwise suggest) that this client hardware address is received from a DHCP server. Rather, this passage merely states that the DHCP server examines and applies rules to this client hardware address. Per the features of Claim 3, *the media access control address and the subnet mask are received from a dynamic host configuration protocol server* and are stored in the data processing system, which advantageously facilitates that transfer of the media access control address and the subnet mask using the DHCP server. While this cited passage also mentions an IP address, such an IP address is not equivalent to a media access control address, but instead is a separate logical address. Thus, this teaching of an IP address also does not teach or suggest the features recited in Claim 3.

Still further regarding Claim 3, two different items are received from a dynamic host configuration protocol server - (1) a media access control address and (2) a subnet mask. The things that are received from the DHCP host per this cited passage are 'host configuration parameters, including an IP address for the client', 'an IP address of a DNS server', 'an IP address of a TFTP server', and 'a name of a device configuration boot file'. There is no teaching or suggestion of any type of subnet mask being returned by a DHCP server. The Examiner reasons that a subnet mask is returned since 'MAC address inherently has a subnet mask associated with it'. Even assuming arguendo that such statement is true, having something 'associated' does not teach or suggest the actual subnet mask itself being returned. In any event, and as shown above, the cited passage does not even teach the returning of a MAC address and thus even to the extent a subnet mask is alleged to be 'associated' with a MAC address, such association

does not establish a teaching or suggestion of an actual subnet mask being returned by a DHCP server, as expressly recited in Claim 3. Accordingly, it is further urged that Claim 3 (and similarly for Claims 10 and 17) is not obvious in view of the cited references do to these numerous additional missing claimed features, as described above.

Applicants initially traverse the rejection of Claim 6 (and similarly for Claims 13 and 20) for reasons given above with respect to Claim 1 (of which Claim 6 depends upon), and urge that the additional cited Harrison reference does not overcome the numerous teaching deficiencies identified above with respect to Claim 1.

Further with respect to Claim 6, it is urged that none of the cited references teach or suggest the claimed feature of “wherein the data processing system is a domain name server”. It should be noted that Claim 6 should not be interpreted in the abstract as merely reciting a generic domain name server.

Rather, Claim 6 must be interpreted in the context of Claim 1 (since Claim 6 depends upon Claim 1). Per the features of Claim 6 when interpreted in the context of Claim 1, such claim recites a domain name server that performs each of the steps of ‘receiving’ (a request for host information from a requestor), ‘identifying’ and ‘returning’ (a response to the requestor). The DNS server as described by the cited Harrison passage at paragraph [0191] does not perform these three steps. Rather, such a DNS server is described as assigning machine names and addresses. This DNS server could not perform a step of ‘identifying a media access control address and a subnet mask using the request’ as it does not have access to this type of information. The present invention and associated specification description is what is the enabling technology that allows a DNS server to identify this type of information. Prior to the present invention, DNS servers did not have access to media access control addresses and a subnet masks for devices. Thus, the combined teachings of the cited references do not in fact teach or suggest a DNS server that performs steps of “receiving a request for host information for a remote computer from a requestor wherein the request includes one of a host name or an Internet Protocol address and is received from the requestor”, “identifying a media access control address and a subnet mask using the request” and “returning a response to the requestor, wherein the response includes the media access control address and the subnet mask”, as per the features of Claim 6 in combination with Claim 1. Accordingly, it is further urged that Claim 6 (and similarly for Claims 13 and 20) has been erroneously rejected due to this additional claimed feature which is not taught or suggested by the cited references.

Applicants initially traverse the rejection of Claim 7 (and similarly for Claim 14) for reasons given above with respect to Claim 1 (of which Claim 7 depends upon), and urge that the additional cited Harrison reference does not overcome the numerous teaching deficiencies identified above with respect to Claim 1.

Further with respect to Claim 7 (and similarly for Claim 14), it is urged that none of the cited references teach or suggest the claimed feature of “wherein the media access control address and the subnet mask are stored together in a record for both a name-to-address file and an address-to-name file”. In rejecting Claim 7, the Examiner states that all of the features of Claim 7 are taught by Harrison at paragraph [0191]. Applicants show that there, Harrison states:

“[0191] DNS: Domain Name System—The on-line distributed database system used to map human-readable machine names into IP addresses. DNS servers throughout the connected Internet implement a hierarchical namespace that allows sites freedom in assigning machine names and addresses. DNS also supports separate mappings between mail destinations and IP addresses.”

As can be seen, this cited passage does not teach any type of storing operation at all. In addition, this cited passage does not teach the storing of a media access control address. In addition, this cited passage does not teach the storing of a subnet mask. As described above with respect to Claim 6, DNS servers (until the present invention) did not have access to this type of information such as media access control address and subnet mask. Thus, the teachings of a DNS server in this cited passage does not teach or otherwise suggest the storing of either a media access control address or a subnet mask.

Still further, while this cited passage alludes to ‘mappings’ between mail destinations and IP addresses, such ‘mapping’ does not teach or suggest both a name-to-address file and an address-to-name file, or the storing of both a media access control address and a subnet mask in both of these (missing) files. Thus, it is further urged that Claim 7 (and similarly for Claim 14) has been erroneously rejected, as *none* of the numerous features recited in such claim are taught or suggested by the cited references.

Therefore, the rejection of Claims 3, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 20 and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 has been overcome.

VI. 35 U.S.C. § 103, Obviousness

Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nelson as applied to Claims 1, 8 and 15 above, in view of Matsuda et al. (US Patent No.: 7,039,688 B2) hereinafter “Matsuda”. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Applicants initially traverse the rejection of Claim 4 for reasons given above with respect to Claim 1 (of which Claim 4 depends upon), and urge that the additional cited Matsuda reference does not overcome the numerous teaching deficiencies identified above with respect to Claim 1.

Further with respect to Claim 4, it is urged that none of the cited references teach or suggest the claimed feature of “wherein the dynamic host configuration protocol server obtains the media access control address and the subnet mask from a remote computer when the remote computer requests an address from the dynamic host configuration protocol server”. In rejecting Claim 4, the Examiner states that all of the Claim 4 features are taught by Matsuda at Figure 7, Element 704; Col. 12, lines 46-52; Col. 12, lines 66-67; and Col. 13, lines 1-5. Applicants urge that these cited passages make no mention of any type of subnet mask. Rather, a media access control address is described. Because Claim 4 recites both a media access control address as well as a subnet mask (and associated operations being performed on both of these two expressly enumerated items), per the features of Claim 4 the ‘media access control address’ is a different item/thing from the ‘subnet mask’. Therefore, it is not proper to interpret Matsuda’s teaching of a media access control address to be both the claimed media access control address and the claimed subnet mask as they are two specific items expressly enumerated in the claim. Restated, if a media access control address were the same as, or a superset of, a subnet mask, then the claim would only need to recite one and not the other. However, they are not the same, and the claim therefore explicitly recites both of these as being separate elements. Quite simply, a teaching of one (media access control address) does not teach or suggest the other (subnet mask). This can also be seen in Applicants’ Figure 5, where a DNS record 500 includes *both* a MAC address 502 and a subnet mask 504. While it may be true that certain network operations require both of these separate items in order to function properly, the DHCP server operations described by the cited Matsuda reference have no such requirement of using both (e.g., it is typically a network router that is concerned with the subnet mask, as this subnet mask is used during a routing operation – a DHCP server has no such concern or use for a subnet mask). Thus, Matsuda’s teaching of a DHCP server using a media access control address does not teach or suggest the claimed subnet mask features of Claim 4. Thus, it is further shown that Claim 4 has been erroneously rejected due to these additional claimed features that are not taught or suggested by the cited references.

Therefore, the rejection of Claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 has been overcome.

VII. 35 U.S.C. § 103, Obviousness

Claims 5, 12 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nelson as applied to Claims 1, 8 and 15 above, in view of Bahl (US Patent No.: 6,957,276 B1) hereinafter “Bahl”. This rejection is respectfully traversed.

Applicants initially traverse the rejection of Claim 5 (and similarly for Claims 12 and 19) for reasons given above with respect to Claim 1 (of which Claim 5 depends upon), and urge that the

additional cited Bahl reference does not overcome the numerous teaching deficiencies identified above with respect to Claim 1.

Further with respect to Claim 5, it is urged that none of the cited references teach or suggest the claimed feature of “wherein the media access control address and the subnet are received from a user submitting the media access control address and the subnet mask and are stored in a data processing system for the data processing system”. As can be seen, a *user* is involved in the operations recited in Claim 5. Such manual intervention by a user may be required in certain situations where a DHCP server is not used to dynamically assign an IP address to a device, but instead a static IP address is used (Specification page 12, lines 5-24; page 14, line 29 – page 15, line 10). The manual user intervention features recited in Claim 5 accommodate such a scenario. Accordingly, per the features of Claim 5 the user submits both a media access control address as well as a subnet mask, and both the media access control address and the subnet mask are stored in the data processing system. In rejecting Claim 5, the Examiner states that all of the features of Claim 5 are taught by Bahl at Col. 9, lines 1-9. Applicants urge that there, Bahl states:

“As illustrated in FIG. 2, when a DHCP client machine 200 initially boots onto the network, it transmits a DHCP DISCOVER 202 to the DHCP server 204 in an attempt to obtain an IP address. The DHCP server 204 analyzes the DISCOVER request 202 to determine the type of IP address to be assigned thereto. The DHCP server 204 analyzes the media access control (MAC) address and the client identifier field for the DHCP client 200 that has sent the DISCOVER request 202.”

As can be seen, this cited passage describes a traditional, automatic dynamic IP address assignment being performed by a DHCP server. In contrast, per the features of Claim 5, a manual user operation is claimed, whereby a user submits information that is to be stored in the data processing system. Quite simply, an automated dynamic IP address assignment as described by the teachings of the cited reference does not teach or otherwise suggest any type of manual user operations as provided by the features of Claim 5.

Still further, even assuming arguendo that this cited passage does describe a manual user operation (which Applicants deny), even then there would still be no teaching or suggestion of operations pertaining to both a media access control address as well as a subnet mask. This cited passage only makes mention of a media access control address and a client identifier field. There is no mention of any type of subnet mask. As described above with respect to Claim 4, and as depicted by Applicants’ Figure 5, a media access control address and a subnet mask are separate items, and the teaching of one (media

access control address) does not teach or suggest the other (subnet mask). Accordingly, it is further urged that Claim 5 (and similarly for Claims 12 and 19) has been erroneously rejected due to the additional claimed features recited in Claim 5 that are not taught or suggested by the cited references.

Therefore, the rejection of Claims 5, 12 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 has been overcome.

VIII. Conclusion

It is respectfully urged that the subject application is patentable over the cited references and is now in condition for allowance. The Examiner is invited to call the undersigned at the below-listed telephone number if in the opinion of the Examiner such a telephone conference would expedite or aid the prosecution and examination of this application.

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Respectfully submitted,

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